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F.A.C.E.-ing Up to Bankruptcy Reform:
Why a Separate Provision Denying
Discharge of Debts Arising Out of Abortion

Clinic Violence Is Redundant
Margaret Whiteman*
I.

Introduction

Between 1994 and 1998, the number of bankruptcies filed in the
United States increased by over seventy-two percent.' In 1998 alone, 1.4
million Americans filed bankruptcy.2 Financial losses from these high
filing rates have exceeded $44 billion.3
On January 31, 2001, Representative George Gekas (R-Pa.)
introduced the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2001 ("BAPCPA").4 The purpose of BAPCPA5 is twofold; it
provides a fresh start for debtors overwhelmed by debt while also
compelling debtors to repay some of their debt by filing Chapter 13
BAPCPA would
bankruptcies instead of Chapter 7 liquidations.6
enhance consumer protection, discourage bankruptcy abuse, and provide
additional tax relief to debtors.7
BAPCPA was generally supported throughout the bankruptcy
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law,
2004. The author would like to give special thanks to Professor Peter C. Alexander for
his enthusiasm, insight, and continued support throughout the writing process. The
author dedicates this Comment in loving memory of her great-grandmother, Ida.
1. 147 CONG. REc. H133, H134 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. ld. at H133-135. In 2000, President Bill Clinton vetoed a bankruptcy bill similar
to BAPCPA in the last days of the 106th Congressional session. Clinton Vetoes
at
2000),
20,
(Dec.
Bill
Bankruptcy
www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/20/clinton.bankruptcy.ap; see 147 CONG.
REC. H134 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
5. H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001).
6. 147 CONG. REc. H133, H133 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001).
7. See H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001).
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community. However, an amendment sponsored by Senator Charles
Schumer (D-N.Y.) created controversy within an otherwise seemingly
bipartisan bill.8 Senator Schumer's proposed amendment added debts
incurred as a result of abortion clinic violence to the list of
nondischargeable 9 debts. 10 Consequently, much debate in the 107th
Congress centered upon abortion instead of bankruptcy." As a result,
the resolution failed 172 to 243.12 The 108th Congress has now
introduced a new BAPCPA under H.R. 975.13 Whether Senator Schumer
will attempt to similarly amend this bill remains uncertain.
The question is whether the Schumer Amendment is a necessary
measure to deny discharge of any debts arising from abortion clinic
violence or, as this Comment concludes, is a redundant amendment
introduced to stop the passage of BAPCPA. The bankruptcy code
already prevents the discharge of debts arising from willful and
malicious injury, 14 as well as debts incurred within Title 18 (Crimes) of
the United States Code. 15 Further, the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1993 ("F.A.C.E.") levies civil and criminal penalties for
intentional use of force or threat of force to individuals obtaining or
providing reproductive health services. 16 Those penalties already include
rendering non-dischargeable those debts that arise from willful and
malicious injuries and providing criminal restitution; thus, any additional
provision excepting the penalties from discharge is redundant.' 7
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze whether the Schumer
Amendment unnecessarily delayed the passage of BAPCPA. This
Comment discusses the effect of the current Bankruptcy Code on the
debts arising from F.A.C.E. Further, it analyzes the effects inclusion and
exclusion of the Schumer Amendment will have on abortion clinic
8. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000 had sufficient votes within Congress to
override President Clinton's veto: 315 votes in the House and 70 in the Senate. 147
CONG. REC. H133, H133 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001). However, the fact that President
Clinton vetoed the bill within the last few days of the session did not allow Congress
sufficient time for an override. Id.
9. Nondischargeable debts remain debts of the debtor after the bankruptcy
proceedings are discharged. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2003).
10. The Schumer Amendment provides for an additional provision (20) to § 523(a),
which excepts debts from dischargeablity. H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001).
11. 148 CONG. REc. H8742, H8756 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002); see infra notes 108110 and accompanying text.
12. Id. See Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Betsy Palmer, Daschle Says Senate Will Not
Consider Bankruptcy Bill Passed by House, CQ MONITOR NEWS, Nov. 15, 2002, at
http://www.bankruptcyaction.com/bankreform.htm#stalled.
13. H.R. 975, 108th Cong. (2003).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
15. Id. § 523(a)(13).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2003).
17. See discussion infra Part III.
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violence. Section I focuses on the history of F.A.C.E. The section also
discusses the history and interpretation of the applicable 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) exceptions to discharge. Section III analyzes how courts
currently interpret the willful and malicious standard of § 523(a)(6), as
well as § 523(a)(7) and (a)(13), to except from discharge civil and
criminal debts arising from F.A.C.E. Additionally, it argues that the
Schumer Amendment is redundant and practically ineffective. Section
IV revisits the question of whether the Schumer Amendment is a
necessary reform or merely a delay in the passage of BAPCPA.
II.

Looking Bankruptcy Straight in the F.A.C.E.

A.

The Freedom ofAccess to Clinic EntrancesAct

The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993
("F.A.C.E.") was introduced on March 23, 199318 as a response to the
9
F.A.C.E.
increase in violence against abortion service providers.'
provides for federal and civil penalties against persons engaged in
violence against abortion clinics, abortion clinic staff, or abortion clinic
patients. 2 0 The Senate stated that because violent tactics were frequently
being used to deny women access to abortions, and because local law
enforcement was inadequately equipped to handle such situations,

18. 18 U.S.C. § 248.
19. For further coverage on abortion clinic violence, see Richard Lacayo, One
Doctor Down, How Many More?, TiME, Mar. 22, 1993, at 46.
20. F.A.C.E. provides:
(a) Prohibited activities. - Whoever(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or
interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from,
obtaining or providing reproductive health services;
(2) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or
interfere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the
First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious
worship; or
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts
to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health services, or
intentionally damages or destroys the property of a place of religious
worship,
shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) and the civil
remedies provided in subsection (c), except that a parent or legal guardian
of a minor shall not be subject to any penalties or civil remedies under this
section for such activities insofar as they are directed exclusively at that
minor.
18 U.S.C. § 248.
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federal legislation was necessary."
Both the House and the Senate considered legislation aimed at
preventing and eliminating violence directed at abortion clinics.22 The
House bill was primarily sponsored by Representative Charles Schumer
(D-N.Y.), 23 and the Senate Bill was sponsored by Senator Edward
Kennedy (D-Mass.). 24 Although the bills contained disparate language, a

House-Senate Joint Committee unified the bills and created F.A.C.E.2 5
F.A.C.E. was signed into law by President Clinton and became effective
on May 26, 1994.26

1.

The History of F.A.C.E.

In 1992, House Bill 1703, a bill similar in purpose to F.A.C.E., was
introduced in the House of Representatives.2 7 The House Subcommittee
on Crime and Criminal Justice conducted a hearing on the proposal on
May 6, 1992.28 Testimony focused on the abortion clinic blockades and
protests that had disrupted reproductive health care services in Wichita,
Kansas in 1991, and Buffalo, New York in 1992.29 The bill was not
considered by the entire House during the 103rd Congress, but was the
precursor to House Bill 796, introduced on February 3, 1993.3 °
Although the House initiated legislation on abortion clinic violence,
it was the proposal by Senator Kennedy 31 that ultimately became law. 32
Both the House and the Senate bills stirred heated debate in Congress. 33

21.
22.

S. REP. No. 103-117, at 3 (1993).
Arianne K. Tepper, In Your FA.C.E.: FederalEnforcement of the Freedom of

Access to Clinic EntrancesAct of 1993, 17 PACE L. REV. 489, 496 (1997).

23. H.R. 796, 103d Cong. (1993). Representative Charles Schumer has since been
elected to the United States Senate.
24. S. 636, 103d Cong. (1993).
25. The language of the joint committee bill is identical to the enacted law. 18
U.S.C. § 248 (2003).
26. See id.27. H. R. Rep. No. 306 (1992); see also Helen R. Franco, Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act of 1994: The FACE of Things To Come?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1083,
1098 (1995) (discussing the evolution of F.A.C.E.).
28. H. R. Rep. No. 103-306 (1992).
29. Id.
30. H.R. 796, 103d Cong. (1993).
31. S. 636, 103d Cong. (1993) (original draft of legislation).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2003).
33. During floor debate, Representative McKinney stated in support of the
legislation: "This bill is directed at terrorists and their malicious acts of violence. These
individuals are blocking real live Americans from exercising their constitutional rights."
140 CONG. REc. H1509, H1520 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994). Promoting defeat of the bill,
Representative Hyde countered: "[The bill] destroys, it shreds, it does violence to the
constitutional precept of equal protection of the law [by singling out the views of antiabortion protestors]." Id. at H 1509, H1514, H 1520.
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The House voted 228 to 16634 "... [to] insist on its amendments to
35
[Senate Bill] 636 and request a conference with the Senate thereon.
36 On April
After a month, the Senate agreed to the conference request.
26, 1994, the conferees appointed by each chamber agreed to file a
38
conference report. 37 The report documents the differences between the
39 This conference bill
Senate and details their resolution.
House and the E40
became F.A.C.E.
2.

The Final F.A.C.E.

Congress used the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to
create appropriate language for F.A.C.E.4' One purpose of the civil
rights law was "to prohibit force or the threat of force against people
' 2 The
exercising their constitutional rights, such as the right to vote."
civil rights law also prohibits any person from willfully intimidating,
injuring, or attempting to intimidate or injure on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin.43 Congress used similar wording in the
enactment of F.A.C.E. 4 By making the offensive behavior punishable
by federal penalties, Congress believed that F.A.C.E. would be a
to take their behavior, or the threat of
deterrent, requiring violators
45
seriously.
more
punishment,
A person violates F.A.C.E. when he or she, by force, threat of force
47
or physical obstruction 46 intentionally injures, intimidates, or interferes
34. Thirty-nine members did not vote.
35. 140 CONG. REc. H1509, H1519-20 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994).
36. 140 CONG. REc. S4183, S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
37. Id.
38. The most pronounced differences between the House and Senate bills were: (1)
Congressional Findings and Purpose; (2) amendments to Title 42 (Public Health and
Welfare) of the United Stated Code versus amendments to Title 18 (Crimes); (3) the
references to "pregnancy or abortion-related services" versus references to "reproductive
health services;" (4) inclusion of a prohibition against interference with freedom of
religion; (5) distinctions between violent and non-violent penalties; and (6) definitions of
"interfere with" and "intimidate." H. REP. No. 306-103 (1992); Franco, supra note 27, at
1105.
39.

See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-488 (1994).

40. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2003).
41. Id. § 245; see also S. REP. No. 103-117, at 21 (1993); Tepper, supra note 22, at
501 (stating that the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was the statutory blueprint for F.A.C.E.).
42. Tepper, supra note 22, at 501.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2).
44. S. REP. No. 103-117, at 21 (1992).
45. Tepper, supra note 22, at 502.
46. "Physical obstruction" is defined as "rendering impassable ingress to or egress
from a facility that provides reproductive health services to or from a place of religious
worship, or rendering passage to or from such a facility or place of religious worship
unreasonably difficult or hazardous." 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(4).
47. "Intimidate" is defined as "to place a person in reasonable apprehension of
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with 48 any person because that person is obtaining or providing
reproductive health services 49 or because that person is seeking to
exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of
religious worship. 50 The Act also prohibits the intentional damage or
destruction of property or a facility because it provides reproductive
health services or is a place of religious worshipi 1 F.A.C.E. does not
prohibit conduct authorized by the First Amendment such as "picketing,
52
leaflet distribution, demonstrations, [or] sidewalk counseling.,
Criminal remedies for violations of F.A.C.E. are as follows: for the
first offense, a violator can be fined up to $10,000, imprisoned for not
more than one year, or fined and imprisoned; for a second or subsequent
offense, a violator can be fined up to $25,000, imprisoned for not more
than three years, or fined and imprisoned. 3 If bodily injury results from
a violation under F.A.C.E., the length of imprisonment must not be more
than ten years, and if death results, F.A.C.E. imposes imprisonment for
54
any term of years or for life.
F.A.C.E. also provides civil remedies.5 5 Any person aggrieved by a
violation under F.A.C.E. may commence a civil action for relief
including temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief, and

bodily harm to him- or herself or to another." Id. § 248(e)(3).
48. "Interfere with" means "to restrict a person's freedom of movement." Id.
§ 248(3)(2).
49. "Reproductive health services" refers to such services "provided in a hospital,
clinic, physician's office, or other facility, and includes medical, surgical, counseling or
referral services relating to the human reproductive system including services relating to
pregnancy or the termination of a pregnancy." Id. § 248(e)(5).
50. Id.§ 248(a)(1),(2).
51. Id. § 248(a)(3).
52. Tepper, supra note 22, at 496.
53. F.A.C.E. provides:
(b) Penalties.- Whoever violates this section shall
in the case of a first offense, be fined in accordance with
this title, or imprisoned not more than one year or both; and
(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense after a prior conviction
under this section, be fined in accordance with this title, or imprisoned not
more than 3 years, or both;
except that for an offense involving exclusively a nonviolent physical
obstruction, the fine shall be not more than $10,000 and the length of
imprisonment shall be not more than six months, or both for the first
offense; and the fine shall, notwithstanding section 3571, be not more than
$25,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not more than 18 months,
or both, for a subsequent offense; and except that if bodily injury results,
the length of imprisonment shall be not more than 10 years, and if death
results, it shall be for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. §§ 248(b)(1),(b)(2).
54. Id. § 248(b)(2).
55. Id. § 248(c).
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compensatory and punitive damages. 56 Costs of the suit and reasonable57
as damages.
fees for attorneys and expert witnesses may be included
Statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 per violation are available by
election of the plaintiffs, in lieu of actual damages, at any time prior to
the final judgment. 58 Civil actions may also be commenced by the
59
Attorney General of the United States and by State Attorneys General.
B.

F.A.C.E. and the CurrentBankruptcy Code

The Bankruptcy Code provides exceptions from discharge for
numerous categories of debts. Under § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code,
debts arising out of willful and malicious injury, as well as criminal
60
Because F.A.C.E.
restitution obligations, are nondischargeable.
exceptions from
these
penalties,
provides for both civil and criminal
discharge play a significant role in determining whether a violator of
F.A.C.E. may discharge debts by filing for bankruptcy. Under the
following analysis, a debtor would be forced to pay any penalty arising
from a violation of F.A.C.E. despite any relief requested from the
bankruptcy court.
1.

Willful and Malicious Injury

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge in
Chapter 7 bankruptcy "[any debt] for willful and malicious injury by the
6
debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." I Although
62 the federal circuit courts
bankruptcy laws are to be uniformly applied,
disagree over the interpretation of the "willful and malicious injury"
exception. 63 ,Willful,,64 and "malicious '' 65 are interpreted as two separate
and independent questions. The term "willful" has been the central focus

56.
57.

Id. § 248(c)(1)(A)-(B).
Id. § 248(c)(1)(B).

58. Id.
59. Id. § 248(c)(2).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6),(a)(9) (2003).
61. Id. § 523(a)(6).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). See, e.g., Kawaauhau v. Geiger (In re Geiger), 172 B.R.
916 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994).
64. "Willful" is defined as "voluntary" or "intentional." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1434 (5th ed. 1979).
65. "Malicious" intent is sufficiently met with a finding of implied malice. Tinker v.
Caldwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904). The interpretation of malicious is not questioned or
debated under the Schumer Amendment; therefore, this Comment will only focus on the

interpretation of "willful." For more information regarding the various requirements for
"malicious," see CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 726 (1997).
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of almost all cases arising under § 523(a)(6).6 6
The Eighth Circuit examined only the "willful" component of
§ 523(a)(6) and adopted an extremely narrow interpretation in Geiger v.
Kawaauhua.67 In Geiger, Mrs. Kawaauhua sought medical treatment
from Dr. Geiger after dropping a box on her right foot. 68 After
diagnosing Kawaauhua with thrombophlebitis of the right leg, Dr. Geiger
admitted her into the hospital and prescribed oral doses of Tetracycline.6 9
After tests returned positive for a bacterial infection, Dr. Geiger switched
the Tetracycline to penicillin. 70
Dr. Geiger testified that Mrs.
Kawaauhua had explained to him that she wanted to minimize costs. 7 1
Based on this decision, Dr. Geiger prescribed oral penicillin instead of
intravenous medication, despite knowing that intravenous medication
was the best treatment.7
Other doctors switched her to intravenous
medication and arranged for a transfer to an infectious disease specialist
after Dr. Geiger went out of town.73 When Dr. Geiger returned, he
determined that the infection had subsided; thus, he cancelled the
specialist and antibiotics. 74 As a result of these cancellations, Mrs.
Kawaauhua's leg worsened and had to be amputated below the knee.7 5
The Kawaauhuas obtained a $355,040.00 medical malpractice
judgment. 76 Dr. Geiger filed bankruptcy to discharge debt arising from
the malpractice judgment under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.77
Concluding that a debtor's conduct cannot be "willful" unless the
injury was based on the commission of an intentional tort, the Eighth
Circuit held that a debtor must intend to injure the creditor or
subjectively believe that an injury is substantially certain to result in
order for the injury to be "willful." 7 8 The Eighth Circuit held that courts
who permit negligent or reckless acts as "willful" are inaccurately
79
deciding the caselaw.
66. Rachel A. Hayes, Comment, Geiger v. Kawaauhau: The Eighth Circuit's
Interpretationof "Willful" Under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, 66 UMKC
L. REV. 451,451 (1997).
67. See Geiger v. Kawaauhua, 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997).
68. Kawaauhua,172 B.R. at 917.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 918.
76. Id. at 919.
77. Geiger v. Kawaauhua, 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997); see Kawaauhua v.
Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 57 (1998).
78. Geiger, 113 F.3d at 852.
79. Id. at 853. The court stated that the circuit court decisions that hold that a looser
standard applies "pay insufficient attention to the legislative history of the relevant
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Eighth
Circuit's decision.8 0 The Supreme Court determined that "the word
'willful' in § 523(a)(6) modifies the word 'injury,' indicating that
nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a
deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. ' 8 1 The Court agreed
with the Eighth Circuit's determination that the § 523 (a)(6) formulation
should trigger the category of "intentional torts ' 82 in a lawyer's mind.83
The Supreme Court rejected the inclusion of negligent and reckless
torts within the § 523(a)(6) exception.84 The Court reasoned that the
inclusion of such torts would include a wider range of situations in which
an act is intentional, but the injury is unintended. 85 The construction
would be "incompatible with the 'well-known guide' that exceptions to
86
discharge 'should be confined to those plainly expressed."'
This construction was contemplated by Congress when it enacted
another exception, § 523(a)(9), 87 which specifically exempts "[debts] for
death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor
vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was
intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance." 88 The
Supreme Court in Kawaauhua reasoned that to adopt an interpretation of
§ 523(a)(6) that included reckless and negligent torts "would render
superfluous Congress's enactment of § 523(a)(9)."'8 9
2.

Criminal Restitution

Section 523(a)(7) excepts from discharge "a debt that is for a fine,
penalty or forfeiture, payable to and for the benefit of a governmental

statutory provisions" and fail "[to] give appropriate weight to the well-established
interpretational rule that exceptions from discharge are to be strictly construed so as to
give maximum effect to the policy of the bankruptcy code to provide debtors with a
'fresh start."' Id.
80. Kawaauhua,523 U.S. at 58.
81. Id. at 61. The Court also noted that "consistently, legislative reports note that the
word 'willful' in § 523(a)(6) means 'deliberate or intentional."' Id. at 58, n.3.
82. Intentional torts generally require that the actor intend the consequences of an
act, not simply the act itself. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 8A, cmt. a (1965).
83. Kawaauhua,523 U.S. at 61.
84. Id. at 64.
85. Id. at 62 (explaining that unintended injuries include injuries that were neither
desired nor in fact anticipated by the debtor).
86. Id. (citing Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915)).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (2003). For further analysis of the interpretation and
implementation of § 523(a)(9), see Veryl Victoria Miles, Interpreting the
Nondischargeabilityof Drunk Driving Debts Under Section 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy
Code: A Case ofJudicialLegislation, 49 MD. L. REv. 156 (1990).

88.
89.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9).
Kawaauhua,523 U.S. at 62.
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unity, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss."'9
The
exception from discharge under § 523(a)(7) does not require a creditor to
challenge the dischargeability of the debt in the bankruptcy court.9 ' The
section was drafted principally to cover the dischargeability of tax
penalties, but also includes criminal restitution obligations.92
The question of whether criminal restitution obligations were
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7) was two-fold. First, penalties for
compensation other than pecuniary loss were difficult to measure in
states using direct measurements of victim losses. 93 Second, certain
limitations contradicted state statutes that gave victims rights of
enforcement through civil courts.94

In 1986, the Supreme Court held that criminal restitution obligations
are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.95 The
Supreme Court focused on the history of the nondischargeability of such
debts as well as state interests. 96 The essential state interest was to
benefit society.9 7

Some courts refused to except from discharge "restitution that is
designed solely to compensate the victim under § 523(a)(7), 98 including
federal restitution obligations.99
In response, Congress added
§ 523(a)(13) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1994.100 The provision excepts
"[debts] for any payment of an order of restitution" under Title 18 of the
United States Code.' 01 Therefore, all restitution obligations
for federal
02
crimes are nondischargeable under Chapter 7 bankruptcies. 1
The same issues of dischargeability were raised in the context of
90. TABB, supra note 65, at 728. The Bankruptcy Code provides:
[T]o the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for
the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection;
or
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred before three
years before the date of the filing of the petition ....
I1I
U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) ("[T]he debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind
specified in paragraph (2), (4), (6), or (15) of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on
request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed").
92.

TABB, supra note 65, at 728.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); TABB, supra note 65, at 728.
TABB, supra note 65, at 728.
Id. at 729.
Id.
Id.

100.

101.
102.

Id.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(13) (2003).
65, at 729.

TABB, supra note

2003]

F.A.C.E-ING UP TO BANKRUPTCY REFORM

Chapter 13. In Chapter 7 filings, the debtor's assets are liquidated to pay
off creditors; in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, however, the debtor's future
income is reserved to pay off debts over time. 10 3 Chapter 13 cases
require payment to creditors equal to or above that which the creditor
would receive if the debtor filed a Chapter 7 liquidation. 0 4 As an
incentive for debtors to pay off more of their debts, Chapter 13 provides
for a "superdischarge," allowing many of the § 523(a) exceptions to be
discharged under Chapter 13.105
The United States Supreme Court clarified restitution obligations
under Chapter 13 in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v.
Davenport.106 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall relied almost
exclusively on the literal meaning of the Bankruptcy Code's language
and legislative history to find that restitution obligations imposed as
conditions of probation in state criminal proceedings were debts under
the Bankruptcy Code and were dischargeable under Chapter 13.1°7
Congress overrode the decision in Davenport, by excepting the "criminal
restitution obligations from a full-compliance Chapter 13 discharge"
under § 1328(a)(3). 10 8 Now, all criminal restitution obligations are
nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
III.

Analysis of the Effect of Bankruptcy on F.A.C.E. Violators

During the congressional debates over BAPCPA, both pro-life and
pro-choice supporters argued vehemently over whether to include the
Schumer Amendment within the Bankruptcy Code.
Pro-choice
supporters argued that the amendment was crucial for F.A.C.E. violators
to be held responsible for their debts. 10 9 Pro-life supporters believed that
the amendment would include negligent and reckless protest acts that
should be discharged under the "fresh start" bankruptcy policies.' 10 The

103. Id. Chapter 13 petitions require a steady income and a plan that receives the
unanimous approval of creditors; if either requisite is lacking, a debtor has the option to
convert to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy or withdraw the petition. Id
106.
107.
108.

See generally TABB, supra note 65, at 711-712.
See generally id. at 712 (discussing Chapter 13 discharges).
495 U.S. 552 (1990).
Id. at 561.
TABB, supra note 65, at 729.

109.

Representative Jenkins supported the Schumer Amendment by stating:

104.

105.

[The Schumer Amendment] penalizes the adjudicated intentional violator
of the law and the intentional tort feasor and precludes him from escaping
the consequences of his act by hiding behind the provisions of the
bankruptcy act. I think this is entirely proper, [sic] because the bankruptcy
act was never intended to protect anyone in this situation.
148 CONG. REC. H8747, H8750 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002).
110. Representative Pitts opposed the Schumer Amendment by arguing:
What we are doing in this bill is taking the identical language [of FACE]
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strong convictions on these legal issues ultimately led to the demise of
the BAPCPA of 2001.111
Both arguments are without substance. First, the inclusion of the
Schumer Amendment, as the pro-choice supporters want, is
inconsequential. The absence of the Schumer Amendment will not alter
the courts' decisions to include F.A.C.E. debts as nondischargeable debts
under the willful and malicious standard of § 523(a)(6). As a result, the
inclusion of the Schumer Amendment is redundant and appears to be
little more than a mechanism for stalling bankruptcy reform.
Conversely, the inclusion of the Schumer Amendment will have
little impact on pro-life protestors. The language of the amendment
prohibits the discharge of debts arising from "intentional" acts; therefore,
it does not prohibit the discharge of debts for reckless or negligent acts.
Additionally, the use of the bankruptcy system to discharge F.A.C.E.
debts is rare," 2 and the procedure that one must then go through to obtain
a discharge is so involved that the inclusion of the Schumer Amendment
would have little or no impact on protest activity.
A.

The Use of§ 523(A)(6) To Except Dischargefrom F.A. C.E. Debts

Three cases have dealt with the issue of whether debts incurred
from abortion clinic violence should be nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6).' 3 In January of 2001, debtors filed for bankruptcy in the
Bankruptcy Court in the District of Maryland." 4 Plaintiffs, mainly
abortion providers, sued Treshman, the regional leader of the American
Coalition of Life Activists ("ACLA"), and other members of ACLA for
posting plaintiffs' names and faces on wanted posters and on the
Internet. 15 The Federal District of Oregon granted plaintiffs substantial
judgments for their injuries." 6 On February 2, 1999, Treshman was
found to have issued "true threats" under F.A.C.E." 7 Compensatory and
punitive damages totaled over $8.5 million plus interest and costs."18
and putting it in the bankruptcy bill so now [protestors] cannot even file
for bankruptcy, unfair bankruptcy. So we are condemning peaceful,
innocent people who have a conscience to protest just to try to save the life
of an unborn to a life of financial ruin.
Id. at H8743.
111. Id. at H8756.
112. See infra Part III.A.
113. See sources cited infra notes 120, 138, 141.
114. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Treshman (In re
Treshman), 258 B.R. 613 (Bankr. Md. 2001).
115. Id. at 614.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 615.
118. Id.at616.
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The district court enumerated findings of fact regarding the
activities of Treshman." 9 The court concluded that each defendant,
acting independently and as a co-conspirator prepared, published, and
disseminated the "Deadly Dozen" poster,120 the wanted poster of Dr.
Robert Grist,' 2 1 and the Nuremberg Files.

22

The court stated that each

123

defendant acted with specific intent and malice in a blatant and illegal
communication of true threats 124 to kill, assault, or do bodily harm to
each of the plaintiffs and with the specific intent to interfere with or
intimidate the plaintiffs from engaging in legal medical practices and
procedures. 25 As 26a result, the court ordered a permanent injunction
against the debtor.1

Based on the District Court's findings of fact, 127 the Bankruptcy
Court distinguished the actions of Treshman from the actions of Dr.
Geiger. 128 The court concluded that the debt arising from Treshman's
conduct was "not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) because the injuries

119. Id.at 619.
120. The Deadly Dozen poster was unveiled during a press conference on January 25,
1995. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2637
(2003). The poster was captioned, "GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY."
Id. The poster lists thirteen abortion providers and includes the home addresses of
several. Id.at 1064-65. The doctors were offered police protection and were encouraged
to wear bulletproof vests by the FBI once the public gained access to the poster. Id.at
1065.
121. The Crist poster was released in August 1995. Id.The poster states "GUILTY
OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" and offers a $500 reward "to any ACLA
organization that successfully persuades Crist to turn from his child killing through
activities within ACLA guidelines." Id.
122. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Treshman (In re
Treshman), 258 B.R. 613, 619 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001).
123. The court specifically found that Debtor Treshman used "intimidation as a
means of interfering with the provision "of abortions and that he "violated or conspired to
violate FACE." Id. at 620.
124. The court determined that the true threat test should consider the factual context
and focus on "what a reasonable speaker would foresee the listener's reaction to be under
the circumstances." Planned Parenthoodof the Columbia!Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at
1075. For a more specific analysis of the Ninth Circuit's determination of "true threat,"
see 116 HARV. L. REV.977 (2003).
125. PlannedParenthoodof the Columbia!Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1075-1076.
126. Id.
127. The bankruptcy court used the Supreme Court's reasoning when determining
that "collateral estoppel may supply the basis for a finding of nondischargeability of debt
based upon an earlier judicial decision, provided that the standard of proof imposed in the
earlier proceeding was equal to or greater than that required in the determination of
nondischargeability in bankruptcy." Planned Parenthoodof the Columbia/Willamette,
Inc., 258 B.R. at 621.
128. Id. ("[T]he case of a surgeon whose error caused death or injury to a patient is
not comparable to that of an abortion protester who targets a physician for injury or
death.").
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were caused by the willful and malicious intent of the debtor."' 129 The
bankruptcy court dismissed the impact of the injunction as a
determinative factor of the conduct of the debtor resulting in a
nondischargeable debt 30 and concluded that the debt was
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) based on the district
court's finding
3'
malicious.'
and
willful
was
conduct
debtor's
that the
The bankruptcy court made an identical determination for debtors
Michael and Jayne Bray. 132 The Brays were involved in the same
activities as Treshman and were also liable for the $8,526,336.14
judgment. 133 The court used the same findings 34of fact and conclusions of
law as it did in the subsequent Treshman case.'
In a separate action, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of New York found that debts arising out of the debtor's
violation of a temporary restraining order prohibiting abortion protestors
from blockading creditor's clinic, and from harassing persons entering or
leaving the clinic,35 were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) of the
Bankruptcy Code.

B. F.A.C.E.-ing the Facts: The Schumer Amendment Is Redundant
Based on the three existing cases presented in the above section,
§ 330 of BAPCPA ("The Schumer Amendment") is unnecessary to
render F.A.C.E. debts nondischargeable. F.A.C.E. debts that require an
individual to file a Chapter 7 liquidation case would not be considered
dischargeable under current Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6).
The Schumer Amendment includes a separate category of
nondischargeable debts in § 523(a)(20). 136 The proposed section
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 622.
Id.

132.

Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Bray (In re Bray), 256

B.R. 708, 711-712 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000).
133. Id. at 709-710.
134. Id.
135. Buffalo Gyn Womenservices, Inc. v. Behn (In re Behn), 242 B.R. 229 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1999).
136. The exact language of the Schumer Amendment is:
SEC. 330 Nondischargability of debts incurred through violations of law
relating to the provision of lawful goods and services
(a) Debts incurred through violations of law relating to the provision of lawful
goods and services.- Section 523(a) of title 11, United States Code, as amended
by section 224 is amended (1) in paragraph(18) by striking "or" at the end;
(2) in paragraph (19) by striking the period at the end and inserting; "or"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
(20) that results from any judgment, order, consent order, or decree
entered in any Federal or State court, or contained in any settlement
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substantively
conduct that
intentionally
"reproductive

mimics the language of F.A.C.E. F.A.C.E. prohibits
"by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction,
injures, intimidates or interferes with" access to
health services" or attempts to do SO. 13 7 The Schumer
Amendment denies discharge for any judgment arising from actions of
the debtor that "by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction,
intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere with" access to lawful goods
and services. 38 The key language in the legislation
is similar except for
39
the difference between singular and plural verbs. 1
Because the language of the Schumer Amendment is substantially
identical to the language in F.A.C.E., the bankruptcy caselaw involving
the dischargeability of debts arising from F.A.C.E. must be addressed.

agreement entered into by the debtor(including any court-ordered
damages, fine, penalty, or attorney fee or cost owned by the debtor), that
arises from(A) the violation by the debtor of any Federal or State statutory law,
including but not limited to violations of title 18, that results from
intentional actions of the debtor that(i) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injure, intimidate, or interfere with or attempt to injure, intimidate or
interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from,
obtaining or providing lawful goods or services;
(ii) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injure, intimidate, or interfere with or attempt to injure, intimidate, or
interfere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the
First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious
worship; or
(iii) intentionally damage or destroy the property of a facility, or attempt
to do so, because such facility provides lawful goods or services, or
intentionally damage or destroy the property of a place of religious
worship; or
(B) a violation of a court order or injunction that protects access to a
facility that or a person who provides lawful goods or services or the
provision of lawful goods of services if(i) such violation is intentional or knowing; or
(ii) such violation occurs after a court has found that the debtor previously
violated(1) such court order or such injunction; or
(1I) any other court order or injunction that protects access to the same
facility or the same person; except that nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed to affect any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing,
peaceful prayer, or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal
prohibition by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (2003).
138. H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 330 (2001).
139. "Whoever" is the subject in F.A.C.E.; the debtor's "actions" is the subject in
§ 330. 148 CONG. REC. H8742, H8744 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002).
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The courts, in interpreting § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, have
already determined that conduct that is actionable under F.A.C.E. that
leads to civil damages is nondischargeable under the willful and
malicious standard. 40
Therefore, under existing law, a pro-life
demonstrator seeking bankruptcy protection may not discharge a debt for
a judgment arising from injuries he or she intentionally causes. 14 1 The
inclusion of an additional category in BAPCPA is redundant.
The Bankruptcy Code also provides for the nondischargeability of
criminal penalties under F.A.C.E., 42 as well as civil penalties that result
from actions by the Attorney General of the United States 143 and by State
Attorneys General pursuant to F.A.C.E. 144 The Bankruptcy Code also
provides for these debts to be nondischargeable under § 523(a).1 45 The
Code provides that any debt "for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit" is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.146 As a result, the criminal fines and civil penalties payable
to the government are already nondischargeable.
Because the criminal fines and civil penalties of F.A.C.E. are
already nondischargeable, the inclusion of the Schumer Amendment in
BAPCPA is redundant for all monetary damages arising out of F.A.C.E.
C. The Effect of the Schumer Amendment on Pro-Life Protestorsand
Supporters
Pro-life supporters argue that the language of F.A.C.E. includes
unintentional acts. 147 Critics of the F.A.C.E. Act believe that courts have
found violations of F.A.C.E. in peaceful protests that did not actually
prevent access to clinics. 141
One such argument 49 is based on the case United States v.
Mahoney. 150 The Mahoney court found physical obstruction and
140.

See supra notes 119-141 and accompanying text.

141.

See discussion supra notes 119-141.

142. The maximum monetary criminal penalty for a violation of F.A.C.E. is $25,000
(only after a second and subsequent violation). 18 U.S.C. § 248(b).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(2). The maximum civil penalty that may be awarded is
$15,000 for nonviolent physical obstruction and $25,000 for any other subsequent
violation. Id. § 248(c)(2)(B).
144. Id. § 248(c)(3).
145. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2003).
146. Id. § 523(a)(7).
147. This argument is based on Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon's letter to
Congressman Smith, which was submitted to the Congressional Record during Floor
Debate
2002).
148.
149.
150.

on November 14, 2002. 148 CONG. REc. H8742, H8743-8745 (daily ed. Nov. 14,
Id. at H8743.
Id.
247 F.3d 279 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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interference with access based on a single protestor kneeling in prayer
outside a locked door to an abortion clinic. 15' The door was a "rarely
used" emergency exit. 52 The court held that a single person kneeling in
prayer rendered use of that door "unreasonably difficult" and forced
patients to use a different entrance. 153 Professor Mary Ann Glendon
argued that the statutory language of F.A.C.E. has been interpreted to
require less than actual obstruction, going so far as to prohibit a single
protestor kneeling in prayer near an unused exit, and has been interpreted
54
to treat anti-abortion statements as evidence of criminal intentions.
F.A.C.E. requires intentional
This argument is ill-founded.
55 and the interpretation of "intentional" will not change with
conduct,
the inclusion of the Schumer Amendment because the language is so
similar. In Mahoney, the defendant passed through a police cordoned
area, after being denied permission to cross by a police officer, in order
to kneel near the emergency exit.1 56 While he was the only person
kneeling at the emergency exit, he was not the only protestor.157 The
court found that, due to Mahoney and the surrounding protestors, patients
were forced to enter through the rear entrance of the clinic.' 58 The court
properly found that several of the defendants intentionally violated
F.A.C.E., thus upholding the fifty-dollar fine for those guilty
defendants.' 5 9 The intentional actions, which did produce the intentional
injury to patients (obstructing the main entranceway requiring patients to
be forced to use the rear entrance), would rightfully be included within
the § 523(a)(6) debts that are not dischargeable under the Bankruptcy
Code.
Further, if passed, the Schumer Amendment would have little
practical effect on pro-life protestors. The chain of events that must
occur to get to the Amendment is tedious and specific. A pro-life
protestor would have to go through the following scenario. The debtor
must violate the law under F.A.C.E. A court must enter an award against
the debtor, or the charges must be settled. The debtor must file for a
non-Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The debtor must then seek to discharge a
debt based on fines, damage awards, or other penalties assessed because
of the unlawful protest activity. In order for the court to except the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
U.S.C.
156.
157.
158.
159.

ld. at 283.
Id.
Id. at 284.
148 CONG. REc. H8742, H8744 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002); see supra note 147.
The word "intentionally" modifies each prohibited activity within F.A.C.E. 18
§ 248(a) (2003).
Mahoney, 247 F.3d at 281-282.
Id.
Id. at 282.
Id.
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discharge, the creditor must challenge the dischargeability.1 60 This path
has been taken by a limited number of abortion clinic protestors.161 The
need for the Schumer Amendment is minuscule at best.
Most violators of F.A.C.E. will not seek refuge within the
bankruptcy system. The fines for nonviolent violations of F.A.C.E. are
minimal. Each defendant in Mahoney, for example, was fined only fifty
dollars for his intentional, nonviolent violation of F.A.C.E. 62 Any
damage award that would require the protection of the bankruptcy courts
would be violent and would most likely be covered under the willful and
malicious standard in § 523(a)(6). 163 Therefore, the general, nonviolent
anti-abortion protestors would not be assessed damages that would force
the protestor into such a financial stress that requires the safety of the
bankruptcy code.
Furthermore, the Schumer Amendment will have little or no
detrimental effect on the protest habits of pro-life supporters. No
protestor will think twice about protesting abortions because his debt
may not be dischargeable. In fact, both Mr. Bray and Mr. Behn continue
to be outspoken on the abortion issue. As recently as November 21,
2002, Rev. Michael Bray praised confessed murders of abortionists:
"Mr. Kopp has acted nobly as a man who showed true compassion for
the immediate welfare of those threatened with gruesome death at the
hands of a wicked child killer."' 164 F.A.C.E. itself had only a short-term
effect on pro-life activism.65 The Christian Gallery, an infamous prolife coalition, has continued to maintain and regularly update its
inflammatory website, which was the keystone of the Treshman case; the
site reads:
Due to The Recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision We
Have Reverted To A Version Of The Nuremburg Files Published
Without The Strike Through Lines Defined By A Hysterical Ninth
Circuit Court Of Appeals As A 'True Threat' ....

Since we were

forced to remove the names of the abortionists who were killed or
wounded, we have found another list that contains precisely the same
160. For a more thorough analysis of this proposition, see Kenneth W. Starr's letter to
the Honorable Steve Bartlett, submitted to the Congressional Record on November 14,
2002. 148 CONG. REc. H8742, H8752-8753 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002).
161. Only three cases have required a bankruptcy court's final decision. See supra
Part III.A.
162. Mahoney, 247 F.3d at 282.
163. See discussion supra Part Il1.
164. Michael Bray, James Kopp: Man of Peace (Nov. 21, 2002), at
www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/aborts.html.
165. See Jeff Gottlieb, Teens Give New Life to OperationRescue, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1998, at Al (reporting that Operation Rescue has begun resurrecting its movement
through teen summer camps).
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this list
information that we had published with the exception 16that
6
uses no graphic devices such as strike through lines, etc.
The protestors who have become bankrupt and are unable to
discharge their debts continue to protest against abortions and will likely
be the subject of another lawsuit.' 67 Undoubtedly, the average protestor
would not consider the inclusion of the Schumer Amendment as a
deterrent to normal protest activities.
IV.

Conclusion

The United States Bankruptcy Code was designed to protect the
68
honest but unfortunate debtor who has become overwhelmed by debt.'
As a result of its general policy, the Bankruptcy Code has been designed
to allow discharges of debts in a specific manner. Realizing the need for
creditors to be compensated for their services, the modem trend in
bankruptcy urges the debtor to use future earnings to set off some of the
dischargeable debts under Chapter 13.169 BAPCPA provides for the
trend by increasing the courts' power to convert Chapter 7 liquidations to
Chapter 13 bankruptcies in cases where the debtor is financially able.
The Schumer Amendment, however, has trampled the efforts of the
bankruptcy lobby by turning the discussion of BAPCPA to the highly
controversial issue of abortion. After lengthy debates on both the House
and Senate floor, as well as tedious conference committee compromises,
the BAPCPA has failed once again in the 107th Congress. 70 Both prolife and pro-choice supporters refused to compromise on the Schumer
Amendment, which created a specific exception to discharge under
§ 523(a).' 7' The Schumer Amendment, however, would have had little
effect on either the pro-life or pro-choice supporters.
The abortion debate will continue to rage within the United States.
It is undoubtedly one of the most controversial issues of the twenty-first
century. These debates, however, have no place within the bankruptcy
system. The system, designed to protect honest but unfortunate debtors
as well as their creditors, has little impact on the goals of both pro-choice
and pro-life supporters.172 Protections are available for abortion patients,
166.

Alleged

Abortionists

and

Their

Accomplices

(May

26,

2003),

at

www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/aborts.html. The website includes a list of "Aborted
and Nearly Aborted Abortionists" as well as judges, politicians, and other celebrities who
support pro-choice policies. Id. This website contains graphic material. Id.
167. See id.
168. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
169. See discussion supra Part 1.
170.
171.

148 CONG. REc. H8742, H8756-57 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002).
Id.

172.

See supra notes 169-171.
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providers, and clinics under F.A.C.E. Law-abiding abortion protestors
who wish to exercise their First Amendment rights are not affected by
73
F.A.C.E. or the Schumer Amendment.
Bankruptcy reform will continue to be an issue for the 108th
Congress. House Resolution 975 was introduced in the new session with
language similar to the BAPCPA of 2001, but omitting the language of
the Schumer Amendment. 74 Congress should use the new bill as an
opportunity to discuss the true issues of bankruptcy, instead of
unnecessarily blinding itself with heated abortion debate. Without the
elimination of such controversial debate, substantive bankruptcy reform
will be unlikely.

173.
174.

18 U.S.C. § 248 (2003); see supra text accompanying note 59.
H.R. 975, 108th Cong. (2003).

